as clinical psychology. And it is a bigger thing than clinical psychology because it is based upon a wider field of observation and induction; it is greater as the whole is greater than the part. Clinical psychology cannot afford to ignore-this greater stream and to remain in splendid isolation. It 'is to be hoped that it will renounce the effort to do so, that the brilliant child will return to the parental fold, bringing rich gifts, but gaining. in return a greater breadth of view, a greater sanity and balance, a more-precise terminology, a greater clarity of thought, and with these, a greater power of dealing effectively with-those most distressing of the disorders th'at afflict mankind, the nervous and mental diseases.
indirectly from Freud, employ' some form or other of analysis. In actual practice, however, these various schools do not confine themselves to a single principle, but in each case there is an admixture of other principles. Thus Dejerine1 although a persuasionist, unquestionably uses suggestion to a very considerable extent, and the same criticism applies, though to a less degree, to Dubois, and to the practitioners of analysis. In spite of this fact each school'tends to regard itself as the sole possessor of the promised land, and to treat its rivals as foolish mortals floundering uselessly in outer darkness. Now it is clear that, if we are to find our wray through all' these acrimonious discussions and disputes, it is necessary to determine precisely the nature and relationship of the three basic principles, suggestion, persuasion and analysis, and the extent to which each of these principles is employed by the contending schools. The present paper is an attempt to progress some little way in'the direction of this goal.
SUGGESTION.
Suggestion is a widely used term, and is employed in medical literature as a convenient and satisfying explanation for all sorts and kinds of phen9mena. Often, indeed, it is put forward as an ultimate and completely sufficient cause, much. as if it were comparable in majesty and power to the law of gravity. Now this can only be justifiable if suggestion is a very exact conception, clearly defined and limited, and capable of precise formulation, and our first problem must be to determine how far thb concept of suggestion fulfills these conditions. If we turn to the literature of psychotherapy we find that Dubois and De6jerine sharply differentiate suggestion from persttasion.
Many of the followers of Freud, on the other hand, hold that persuasion is essentially identical with suggestion, and that the nmethod of psycho-analysis is absolutely distinct from either of them. A third school, again, maintains that psycho-analysis is merely an insidious and prolonged form of suggestion. Turning next to psycbopathology, we find that Babinski regards suggestion as a sufficient explanation of hysteria, while other authorities ascribe the phenomena of neurasthenia to autosuggestion. Finally, psychologists tell; us that suggestion is a normal ,process in the human mind, and that it is responsible for our religious and political views, our patriotism, caprices and prejudices.
Now it is clear that something which explains hysteria and neurasthenia, and is a characteristic of. normal health, which is responsible for our religion, politics, caprices, prejudices, and therapeutics, must either be a very inexact conception, or denote a factor so widespread and universal that it is useless to invoke it as a weapon of explanation. It explains everything and therefore it explains nothing. It will be well, therefore, to investigate more closely the sense in which the word suggestion is used by these various authorities, to determine whether this sense is always the same, and whether the word is not sometimes used to denote processes which we already know under other names, and finally to inquire whether it is possible to formulate an exact conception to which the term suggestion may usefully be limited. A convenient starting point for this investigation may be found in McDougall's definition of suggestion as "a process of communication resulting in the acceptance with conviction of the communicated proposition in the absence of logically adequate grounds for its acceptance" [4] . Now the opening words of McDougall's definition "a process of communication" immediately exclude a certain number of the phenomena which some authors bring under suggestion, but even with this limitation it is questionable whether the definition does not cover a field so wide that the conception is of little use as a practical weapon of explanation. Most of our beliefs are held without any logical basis, though by the manufacture of rationalizations we endeavour to find such a basis when our beliefs are attacked, and we are constantly accepting propositions in the absence of logical grounds for their acceptance. The mind of man moves so frequently and universally along this road that to cite the process as an explanation of some particular phenomenon is hardly more satisfying than to explain the peculiar features of some animal or plant by the existence of an atmosphere. To begin with, if we adopt as a reasonable measure of " acceptance with conviction" our preparedness to act upon an idea, it may be said that every communicated idea tends to be accepted with conviction provided that it does not conflict with other ideas. If it is announced to me that dinner is ready, I accept the proposition, and proceed to move into the dining room without instituting an inquiry into the logical basis of the assertion, unless the announcement is made at a time when I am normally expecting to go to bed. This is the process termed " simple communication," and there is no need to' invoke any special function of suggestibility to explain its action. Such a process would appear to be all that is necessary to account for certain of McDougall's conditions favouring suggestibility, "lack of organized knowledge" for example. The acceptance by an uneducated man of a proposition patently impossible to anyone with special knowledge of the subject is psychologically identical with my acceptance of the proposition that dinner is ready. When, however, a communicated idea is accepted when there are 'or should be conflicting ideas present, an obviously different process has come into action. If I am informed that one of my friends is playing golf, and I believe this assertion in spite of the fact that this same friend is sitting by my side, then clearly we are confronted with a phenomenon into which some other factor than simple communication must enter. This other factor is evidently a neglect or inhibition of ideas which are incompatible with the communicated idea. The first amendment to McDougall's definition which we shall therefore venture to propose is that the term suggestion should only be applied where such a neglect or inhibition of conflicting ideas is present. When, indeed, the phenomenon is due merely to neglect, the psychological process is so essentially different from that which underlies irrhibition, that it would probably be advantageous to exclude it from the conception of suggestion. If, for example, we accept a proposition when we are fatigued which we should not so accept in our normnally vigorous state, this occurs because fatigue has lessened the integrative capacities of our mind, and conflicting ideas are not brQught into contact with the proposition which they would otherwise destroy The process here is psychologically almost identical with the simple communication already described, and essentially similar to the acceptance by an uneducated man of a proposition which is in fact impossible. It would seem advisable, therefore, to reduce the limits of suggestion still further, and to confine it to those cases where there is an actual inhibition of conflicting ideas. This reduction brings suggestion into an interesting relation to attention, for in the latter there is an inhibition of irrelevant ideas, whereas in the former there is an inhibition of relevant ideas. The comparison opens up a promising avenue for speculation, but it would lead to fields outside the scope of this paper, and cannot be pursued further here.
If it is agreed that the essential process in suggestion consists in an inhibition of conflicting ideas and the resultant acceptance with conviction of a proposition based on illogical or non-logical grounds, we may next inquire whether this is a process with which we are already familiar under other names. A little consideration will show that we are very familiar with this process, and that it has received many other names. It is the process which I have called elsewhere " thinking due to. the action of a complex" as opposed to "rational thinking"; it occurs whenever our stream of consciousness is directed by emotional or instinctive forces, and it is responsible unquestionably for most of the movements of our mental machinery. The lover does not fervently believe in the perfections of his lady because he has logically deduced those perfections from the facts at his disposal, but because all his thoughts and perceptions are twisted in a definite direction by the emotional systems which constitute his love, and-against that directive force all the logic in the world is impotent. Many of the beliefs and opinions of the normal man are due to mechanisms similar in kind, though less grossly obvious. It may be said, indeed, that the greater part of our thoughts and activities are due to forces of which we may or may not be conscious, but which are assuredly not logical in character. Logic plays a part in directing the minor currents in the stream, but the power which drives the stream and determines its main course originates in emotional systeins analogous to that which we see in action in the lover. The effect of such an emotional system is to throw into the stream of consciousness ideas belonging to the system, to reinforce cur-rents in harmony with it, and to inhibit currents which are incomiipatible or in conflict -with the goal which it is trying to achieve. These emotional systems are known by many names, bias, prejudice, intuition and so forth, but their action is the same in each and every case, the forcing of the stream of consciousness into a direction which will subserve the goal of the system, and the inhibition of all ideas and tendencies which would conflict wi'th that goal. Now this action is precisely that which we have seen to be characteristic of suggestion, and it will itumediately be. clear that suagestion is merely a particular example of the activity of an emotional system of the kind described.
To use the termiinology which we have employed elsewhere, suagestion is a variety of " comrlplex thinking."' How large a variety it constitutes is a matter of definition and arbitrary limitation. But its utility as a weapon of explanation obviously depends on the preciseness of the definition and the narrowness of the limitation, for if we make the conception so wide that it practically includes all types of " complex 'Vide the author's "Psychology of Insanity," Cambridge University Press, Chap. V. "Complex" is used t)erein in a more extetided sense than that generally given to it, and inidicates any affective systLm capable of directiDg and influencing the stream of consciousnless.t D-10 thinking," it will also include most of the mental activity of man, and its value as an explanation of some particular phenomenon will be almost negligible.
These considerations enable us to understand the apparently discrepant views as to the nature and action of suggesti.on held by thevarious authorities whom we have quoted. The discrepancies are due to the wider or narrower limits assigned to the concept of suggestion by each authority, and in part also to the absence of any clear cut concept, or of any definite limits. While in some cases suggestion is regarded asincluding the whole sphere of " complex thinking," in others it is narrowed down to include only hypnosis and closely allied phenomena, and between these two extremes every 'intermediate grade may be found. Those who explicitly or inmplicitly embrace the first extremeinterpretation, and who' bring under the head of suggestion every mental process due to the' action of an emotional factor, naturally explain a vast number of phenomena thereby, but factors of this kind' are so universal that the explanation is correspondingly unsatisfying and incomplete. The explanation is true enough so far as it goes, but it does not go far enough to'be of any practical use. If our knowledge is to be advanced we requireto know what is the particular emotional factor involved, and what are the precise circumstances' of its operation. A perusal of the literature makes it very clear, indeed, that the indiscriminate use of the word suggestion in these cases is altogether pernicious, because too often it is regai ded as a completely satisfying explanation, and the necessity of making further inquiries is entirely neglected. It is evident, then, that if the conception of suggestion is to be practically useful it must be narrowed down to limits which will mark off a definite variety of " complex thinking," and which will not include any And every variety to which the word has been hitherto looselyapplied. These limits will natural,ly be a matter for arbitrary selection, but it will be agreed that they should be so fashioned as to include within their boundaries those processes to which the word suggestion is universally apptied, and only such other processes as can be shown to be closely allied thereto. In this way the common signification of theword will be preserved as nearly as possible. Now the processes which are universally regarded as typical instances of suggeation are the phenomena which occur in hyonosis, and the allied phenomena which are capable of being produced in the waking or, normal state, and if' we are to find an exact conception of suggestion it must be sought.
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by an investigation of the essential features of these phenomena. In the typical instances in question a proposition is explicitly or implicitly stated by one person, and is accepted with conviction by another person, and it would probably be best to apply theterm suggestion only to those cases where this direct relation between persons exists. This limitation is, in fact, partly but not . completely implied by the opening words of McDougall's definition "a process of communication." The amended definition of suggestion resulting from these various considerations, would therefore read " a process of, communication whereby a proposition is communicated by one person to another and is accepted with conviction by the latter in the absence of logically adequate grounds for its acceptance, and owing to the fact that conflicting processes which are or should be present are inhibited." a It is evident that even this amended definition does not give us a conception with sharply cut limits, for it is easy to adduce a whole series of instances linking up the typical texamples of suggestion to almost any and every variety of " complex thinking." If we are to establish a sharply cut conception, it nmust be shov%n that-in each case where a proposition is accepted in this manner the acceptance is due to the action of one particulir psychological mechanism, and we may next inquire how far it is pos.ible to accomplish this. Now in all cases of " complex thinking "the essential feature of the process is that the stream of consciousness is directed by a force '"hich we have loosely described as an " emotional system."* Although these " emotional systems " lmay apparently be of all sorts and kinds it will be found on analysis that they all derive their propulsive and directive power from the incorporation within them of one or more of the great instinctive forces of the mind. The demonstration of this vastly important fact is the noteworthy achievement of McDougall's work on social psychology. If all " complex thinking" is due to the action and interaction of instinctive processes, then suggestion, which is only a variety of " complex thinking," must also be dependent on forces of this character. Now if it could be shown that suggestion, in the limited sense we have proposed, owes its effect to certain particular instincts, or to a definite combination of instincts, we might then be able to formulate the exact conception of which we are in search. Several attempts have, in fact, been 'imade to explain the process of suggestion by the action of such particular instincts or their combination. McDougall [4] ascribes it to the interaction of the instincts of self-assertion and self-abasement. Trotter [5] practically identifies suggestion with herd-instinct, while. Freud and his followers [3] maintain that the motive force is provided by the sex instinct. Space will not permit of a detailed -examination of these various views, but it may be said that none of them is entirely satisfactory, and none of them provides the clear cut conception we need. -The evidence would seem to indicate, indeed, that the phenomena commonly ascribed to suggestion are not due to the action of any one instinct or combination of instincts, but that the motive force may be derived from different sources in different cases.
The conclusion to be drawn from these considerations is that, even within the narrow limits with which we have attempted to circumscribe it, suggestion is not a well defined conception capable of affording a complete explanation of any phenomenon. When a phenomenon is ascribed to suggestion we have learnt little more than that it beloDgs to the sphere of " complex thinking," and is therefore .due to the action of an emotional, or more properly, instinctive factor. Such a classification can obviously form only a first stage of the investigation, and to obtain anything that can be reasonably called a complete explapnation we must ascertain the particular emotional factor at woik, and the precise circumstances in which it acts. This criticism applies to many of the attempts that have been made to explain the mechanism of the psychoneuroses, suchs as the tbeory of Babinski and his followers which postulates suggestion as the essential cause of hysteria. This theory demonstrates an obvious fact of observation, but leaves out everything worth explaining-why the patient is so abnormally suggestible, what is the particular emotional force responsible for the suggestion, and why he has developed these particular symptoms and not others. The answer that is sometimes given to these further inquiries, that the patient has an hysterical constitution, is a refuge strictly comparable to--Moliere's famous explanation of the hypnotic properties of opium, but hardly worthy of admission within the portals of science.
Another word frequently cited as a convenient explanation for various phenomena is autosuggestion, and here again usage is so loose and ambiguous that the need for definition and limitation is imperative. One sense in which it is used is, for example, to explain the process by which a patient who is convinced that his arm is paralysed actually develops a functional paralysis of the arm. Now the process by which the acbual paralysis follows the conviction is probably direct and Section of Psychiatry inevitable, the two stages being little more than different aspects of one and the sairme fact, but whatever its nature may be it has certainly nothing to do with suggestion. 'The suggestion lies farther back in the sequence of causes, and is responsible for the acceptance with conviction of the proposition that the arm. is paralysed. Once this proposition is so accepted the actual' paralysis follows inevitably, but by a`mechanism in which suggestion plays no further part. In this sense, therefore, in so far as the word is not definitely misleadimgg it is merely tautological.
Another sense in which autosuggestion is emiployed is to designate those varieties of "complex thinking" in which a direct relation between persons is not involved. That is to say, it designates all "complex thinking" except suggestion. in the narrowed meaning we have advocated for that word, and is proferred, for example, as an explanation of our politics, prejudices and so forth. Here again the term would seem to be misleading and redundant. A third sense in wliich autosuggestion is used is to describe a process whereby one seeks to narrow down one's field of consciousness and to fill it with a single idea as, for instance, when we endeavour to produce a pseudohallucinatory sensation by fixing our attention on a small area of our skin. The process here clearly presents some resemblance to the production of similar phenomena by bypnosis, and in this limited sense the use of the word autosuggbstion is probably justifiable.
We may sum up the position now. reached as follows. All the processes ascribed to suggestion are in reality examples of "complex thinking," and-how large a section of "complex thinking" is to be included under suggestion is a matter for purely arbitrary selection and limitation. Probably it would be practically advisable to limit the term to processes of communication involving a direct relation between persons, but even here no specific elements are present. In every case the only essential feature is the action of an emotional or instinctive factor, which is the essential feature of all " complex thinking." Processes of this kind are, however, so common in the human mind that to' explain any particular phenomenon by ascribing it to " complex thinking" or to "'suggestion" is altogether inadequate. The explanation can only be accepted as satisfying and complete when we have ascertained the particular emotional factors responsible, and the conditions under which they have produced their results.
This preliminary investigation of the, nature of suggestion has necessarily been somewhat lengthy, but it has enabled us to achieve a standpoint from which our main problem, the use of suggestion as a 21 at SAGE Publications on June 21, 2016 jrs.sagepub.com Downloaded from therapeutic agent, may be easily attacked. The therapeutic aim of suggestion is to implant in the nind of the patient a certain conviction, and this conviction generally consists ihithe firm belief that a symptom has disappeared, or is about to disappear. Its utility in the psychoneuroses is dependent on the fact that many of the symptoms of these disorders are the result of beliefs held wlth covviction by the patient. However intricate and lengthy the chain of causation which has produced them may be,.the penultima'e link in the chain is the conviction that certain svmptoms are present. A functional paralysis of the arm, for example, may be the final result of a long chain of psychical causes, but the penultimate link is the conviction that the arm is paralysed. Now the .object of suggestion is to destroy that conviction by imnplanting in the mind the opposite conviction, namely that the arm is not paralysed, and if this process is successful the chain of causation is broken at its penultimate link, and the symptom disappears. Suggestion is able to accomplish this by virtue of *its capacity for inhibiting conflicting ideas and tendencies, whereby the action of the ideas and tendencies responsible for the symptom is blocked, and the conviction communicated by the suggestion is permitted to flourish unchecked. This capacity is dependent upon the employment of an emotional or instinctive factor, and, in the narrower conception of suggestion we have proposed, this emotional or instinctive factor is one involving a direct relation between two persons, the doctor and the patient. The consideration of the wider question, how far and in what way emotional or instinctive factors which do not involve this direct relation between persons may be employed as therapeutic agents, will be postponed until we have considered the nature of the second basic principle, persuasion.
PERSUASION.
Persuasion, like suggestion, is a term of regrettably vague and ambiguous character. It is used in the literatnre in two quite distinct senses which may be fathered upon Dubois [2] and D6jerine [1] respectively. For Dubois it is a puirely logical process, for D6jerine it is a logical process, but one in which affective factors play a necessary and important part. These two conceptions must naturally be dealt with separstely. Dubois conceives persuasion as a procese in which certain effects are produced by chains of logical reasoning, and distinguishes it sharply from suggestion. The latter is dependent upon blind faith, while the former appeals to clear logical reason. Now Section of Psychiatry we bear in mind the analysis of the nature of suggestion which has already been made, the relationship to it of Dubois's conception of persuasion is immediately apparent. This relationship is identical with that which exists between "rational thinking" and "complex thinking." In the former the stream of consciousness proceeds in a direction determined entirely by the intrinsic values of its elements, each step being the logical consequence of the preceding steps. Emotional factors play no part, and the conclusidn follows inevitably from the premises just as a proposition of Euclid inevitably leads us along a road fixed by the logical relationship of its terms. The conclusion can be predicted with certainty by an observer who knows only the proposition and nothing at all of the man who is thinking it. In "complex thinking," on the other hand, the direction of the stream of consciousness is conditioned by emotional factors which force it into a path which will subserve the aim of the emotional system in question, and which distort the logical relationship of its elements so that this aim may be achieved. Here the conclusion cannot be predicted unless the observer knows not only the proposition, but also the man who thinks it and the emotional systems which dominate his mental activity.
If persuasion is identical with rational thinking then it is clear that the superiority to suggestion which Dubois claims for it is based on very solid grounds, for rational thinking leads to knowledge, whereas suggestion leads only to beliefs erected upon an insecure foundation. The sole question which arises is how far rational thinking can be used for therapeutic ends and how far it is capable of destroying the convictions responsible for psychoneurotic symptoms, for the impotence of logic against the creations of an emotional system is : phenomenon which is only.too frequent and obvious. In practice, indeed, it will be found that the utility of Dubois's persuasion is severely limited on account of this difficulty, but it is nevertheless indubitable that it has utility.
The therapeutic employment of persuasion is dependent upon a process which in its final stages is identical with that which occurs in suggestion. We have seen that many of the symptoms of the psychoneuroses are the result of beliefs held with conviction by the patient, and that, however intricate the chain of causation may be, the penultimate liak is the conviction that certain symptoms are present. Now the aimn of persuasion, just as the aim of suggestion, is to implant in the mind of the patient the opposite conviction, namely that the symptoms have disappeared, or are about to disappear. This is 23 at SAGE Publications on June 21, 2016 jrs.sagepub.com Downloaded from 2I4art: The Methods of Psychotherapy explicitly stated by Dubois in the following words: "The nervous patient is on the path to recovery as soon as he has the conviction that he is going to be cured; he is cured on the day when he believes himself to be cured" [2] . To take again the example formerly selected to illustrate the action of suggestion, that of functional paralysis of the arm. If this condition is treated by persuasion the aim, just as before, is to destroy the conviction that the arm is paralysed, upon which the actual paralysis is dependent, and to implant in its stead the conviction that the arm is capable of normal movement. But in this case the conviction is achieved, not as the effect of an emotional process, but as the logical result of a chain of reasoning. It is demonstrated to the patient, for example, that all the tissues of his arm are healthy, that none of the signs which inevitably belong to an organic lesion are present, that the muscles of the arm are actually capable of work, and so forth. From all these premises the conclusion that the arm is not paralysed follows as an inevitable logical deduction.
Dejerine's conception.of persuasion cannot be so easily described and placed,in its relation to other methods. This difficulty arises, I believe, because his conception does not correspond to any simple process, but is made up of a variety of processes7 essentially different one from-another. In various passages in which he defines persuasion as he understands it, he states, for example, that persuasion consists in explaining to the patient the true reasons for his condition, in establishing the patient's confidence in himself, and in awakening the different elements of his personality capable of becoming the starting point of the effort which will enable him to regain his self-control; he says, further, that in order for this to happen an element of feeling must intervene between the doctor's reasoning and the acceptance of this reasoning by the patient, and that psychotherapy depends wholly and exclusively upon the beneficial influence of one person on another [f]. Now at least three distinct processes are invol,ved here. First, the explanation to the patient of the nature of his condition is a reasoning process identical with the 'method of Dubois. Secondly, in so far as the effect is dependent upon the beneficial influence of one person on another, it is dependent upon an emotional relation existing between the two persons,. and is therefore clearly due to suggestion in the narrower sense.. Thirdly, the employment of the various elements of the patient's personality as weapons for achieving the therapeutic end consists essentially in making use of.those emotional forces in the patient which do not necessarily involve a direct emotional relation to the doctor, and Section of Psychiatry is therefore identical witb " complex thinking " in general. This third process is the only one which we have not already investigated. It will be remembered that at the end of the section on suggestion we postponed for later consideration the question how far and in what way emotional or instinctive factors which do not involve a direct relation between persons may be employed as therapeutic agents. This question niust now be examined, for it is evident that the third process contained in Dejerine's method is an attempt to provide a practical answer to it. We have seen that most of the movements of our mental machinery are due to the driving power exerted by emotional systems, that the-se systems direct the stream of consciousness into channels which will subserve their goal, and that a great part of our beliefs and opinions are due to agencies of this character. Now it is clear that by suitable stimulation and combination of the emotional systems existing in our patients, effects can be obtained which will have a therapeutic value. Thus, by making use of the religion, ambitions, affections and other .weapons which are available in the patient's mind we may be able to destroy or mould into other forms the mental processes responsible for his symptoms. The effect here is due to the employment of emotional factors, but it.is not mainly due to the employment of an emotional relation existing between the doctor and the patient. It is in other words the result of "complex thinking," but not the result of suggestion in the narrow sense. The part played by the doctor here is comparable to the action of an engine driver who merely directs the forces produced in the engine.
This process constitutes one of the most powerful and efficient weapons in our therapeutic armoury, and we shall subsequently see that it is employed, to some extent at least, by all psychotherapists, to whatever school they may profess to belong. Sometimes it is used merely as a method of removing synmptoms, the object being, just as in the case of suggestion, to produce in the patient a conviction that the symptoms have disappeared or are about to disappear. In other cases, however, it is used as a means of readjuesting the causes which are ultimately responsible for the symptoms. Here the previous elucidation of the causes by some analytical nlethod is necessarily presupposed, and we may now pass on to investigate the nature of these analytical methods.
Hart : The Methods of P.ychotherapy ANALYTICAL METHODS.
The term " analysis " is used in this paper to indicate any method whereby the nature and relationship of the causes responsible for the patient's condition are' determined, and the condition removed by the rearrangement and readjustment of these causes. It is not meant to be synonymous with psycho-analysis, a word which should only be applied to the method devised by Freud and generally associated with his name. Psycho-analysis is clearly analysis, but the latter is a wider term and one applicable to all therapeutic procedures which satisfy the definition given above. It is unquestionable, of course, that all modern analytical methods owe a great debt to the work of Freud, and that in each and every one of them many of his essent'ial principles are incorporated. Psycho-analysis, however, i;volves the acceptance of a particular theory of causation, and should not be used to designate methods which are not governed by this theory.
The employment of analysis as a therapeutic measure is based on the assu.mption that certain disorders are of psychogenic origin. If this assumption is admitted, if it is agreed that some disorders are the result of a chain of mental causes, then it is immediately obvious that treatment should aim at elucidating those causes, and then so altering or rearranging them that their original effect is no longer produced. This procedure is so evidently denanded by all the canons of scientific medicine that the point is hardly worth labouring. How many and what disorders are to be included in the psychogenic group is a question which cannot be fully answered in the present state of our knowledge. We are yet uncertain, for example, how far the various types of insanity can be brought under this head. So far as the psychoneuroses are concerned, however, the view that they are essentially of psychogenic origin has steadily gained ground during the past fifty years, and has been so confirmed and extended by the experiences of the' War, that it would be fair to say that it is now accepted by almost every authority in every country. If this is so, then clearly the analytical miethod of treatment is emiipently applicable to these disorders. Dispute can only arise as to the nature and action of the causes responsible, and the relative merits of different methods of ascertaining and removing them. It is upon diffeiences of opinion with regard to these matters that the therapeutic procedures adoptedby various authorities are based, but the examination and criticism of Section of Psychiatry these differences would take us far beyond the limits of this paper, which aims only at the consideration of broad general principles. RELATION OF SUGGESTION, PERSUASION AND ANALYSIS AS THERAPEUTIC METHODS.
We are now in a position to consider the relation between suggestion, persuasion and analysis as therapeutic methods. Analysis is distinguished from the other two in that it is aimed at the causes responsible for the condition, and seeks to remove the condition by renmoving or rearranging those causes, whereas suggestion and persuasion, in so far as they are not conmbined with analysis, are aimed -solely at the synmptom, and seek to remove the symptoms without reference to the causes which have produced them. This distinction may be made clear with the aid of the following diagrams. and s indicating the symptoms prodtced by their inteiaction.1 In a large number of the symptomns of the psychoneuroses the penultimate link (e) will consist in the conviction that a certain symptom is present, and from this penultim;ate link the symptom itself follows directly in the manner already desciibed. Now if this condition is treated by suggestion, attention is directed solely to the penultimate link, and an endeavour is made to destroy this, and to substitute for it the conviction that the symptom is not present (e'). If the procedure is successful the symptom promijptly disappears, because the chain of causation responsible for it'is broken. The break is effected, however, only at the ienultimate link, the causes, a, -b, c, d, are left in situ, and the situation achieved is as represented in fig. 2 . It will be clear that, as the primlary causes have not been attacked, there is an obvious possibility either of relapse or of the development of another similar symptom, a possibility notoriously borne out by clinical experience.
If, next, the symptom is treated by pure persuas'ion a very similar state of affairs is produced. The ainm as before is to destroy the penultimate link (e), and to substitute for it the conviction that the symptom is not present. This is accomplished here, however, not by implanting the conviction with the aid of an emotional factor, but by collecting together trains of thought whifch will lead to the conviction by their intrinsic logical force. The situation now is represented by fig, 3 , where f, g and h indicavte the trains of thought in question which have produced the conviction (el) that the symptom is not present. The symptom disappears just as in the case of treatment by suggestion and for the same reason; it will be observed, however, that the primary causes are again left untouched. This similarity between the two methods of treatment is evidently not alwaysappreciated by the tixponents of pure persuasion, and suggests that the vaunted superiority of persuasion is of doubtful validity. It may be said, however, that it is unquestionably superior to suggestion in that the removal of the symptom is achieved by an integrating process presumably more stable than the mere implantation of a belief without support or foundation.
If, lastly, the symptom is treated by analysis, attention is directed, not merely to the penultimate link, but to all the links in the chain of ' The diagram is, of course, purely schematic and unduly simplistic. The causes would be represented more properly by a netwo' k of circles than a line of circles, but this has been omitted in order to avoid complicating the figure. gradually increasing "nervousness" and anxiety, due to the conflict between the opposing forces of self-preservation and diseipline, the conflict which is the characteristic feature of the war neuroses. This conflict had latterly be1come acute, and it was a biological necessity that some solution of the situation should occur. , Hence had ariEen the unconscious motive which is an integral factor in the causation of all psychoneuroses, the motive wl;ich desires a disability as the only solution whereby the conflict can be satisfactorily relieved. As a result of the interaction of all these, and perhaps of other causes, the penultimate link (e), the conviction that the arm was paralysed, was produced, and the actual paralysis followed inevitably. Now, if this condition is treated by suggestion, our object is to produce the conviction that the arm is not paralysed. This is achieved by hypnosis or other method of suggestion, and the paralysig promptly disappears. No attention whatever is paid to the causes which produced the symptom. Their original outlet is blooked, but they are left as a pathogenic focus whence may develop similar or other symptoms.
If on the other hand, the condition is treated by persuasion, we seek to prove to the patient by a logical 'demonstration that his arm is not paralysed. We show him that all the tissues are healthy, that the signs which should accompany a real paralysis are absent, that if we lift his arm and then remove the support while his attention is diverted the arm does not drop immediately, and that therefore his muscles must actually be functioning. By collecting together these and similar arguments we shake and finally destroy the conviction on which the paralysis is dependent, and when this aim has been attained the paralysis inevitably disappears. But it will be observed that here again the causes primarily responsible for the paralysis have not been investigated or attacked, and the pathogenic focus is left untouched just as in the case of suggestion. If, finally, the condition is treated by analysis, all the causes mentioned above are first unearthed, and then an attempt is made to destroy or rearrange them. This latter process may consist, for example, in briDging the various factors into the full light of consciousness, making their relationship and significance apparent to the patien:t, and subjecting them to the solvent action of the forces available in the patient's mind, his ambitions, self-respect, religion, traditions, or whatever other weapon can be pressed into service. It will be clear that we are employing here the process which was found to form a part of D6jerine's conception of persuasion,the utilizing of the emotional factors existing in the patient's mind as weapons capable of readjusting and integrating the mental elements responsible for the symptoms. Only in this case the method is applied to the causes ultimately responsible, wbich have been elucidated by analysis, and not merely to the symptoms themselves.
These considerations lead to the conclusion that analysis is obviously superior to the other methods we have considered, and it might be supposed that it ought always to be used to the exclusion of the others. This would be an erroneous deduction, however, because it is found in practice that a considerable number of conditions can be dealt with more rapidly and conveniently. by the emplo3ment of suggestion or persuasion. Certain hysterical symptoms, such, for exapnple, as paralysis, functional gaits, mutism and so forth can be renmoved with ease and speed by suggestion or persuasion, bhich would involve a lengthy and complicated procedure were they 'treated solely by analysis. It. may be said, nevertheless, that even in these cases treatmient is far from being adequiate and complete unless the removal of the prominent symptoms is followed by an analysis aimed at the elucidation ana rearrangement of the ultimate causes. Only in this way can a reasonable stability and freedom from relapse be secured. Casesuhere the mere employment of suggestion or persuasion has produiced apparently soli& cures are frequent enough, but this is probably due to 'the fact that an alteration of the primary causes has been effected by some means independent of the actual 'treatme7t. A war hysteric, for example, may have his symptoms removed by suggestion, and mjay then be discharged from the Army, so that the miiost imiiportant of the ultimate causes, the conflict between self-preser-vation and duty, is rendered inert. Reasons of this kind. no doubt help to explain the fact that treattmient by suggestion or persuasion is often far mijore efficient and satisfactory in war psychoneuroses than in the psychoneuroses of the civilian. In any case the sphere of these nmethods is certainly linmited, and they are only capable of application to a comparatively sniall section of the great group of the psychoneuroses. It would seem, indeed, that they are applicable only to those cases in which the penultinmate link in the chain of causation consists in the conviction that a ceitain symptom is present. Where this link is absent, and where psychical causes have produced symptoms without its intervention, suggestion and persuasion by themselves seem to be impotent. This holds for example in, the anxiety neuroses, which bulk largely amongst the war cases, and in which analytical methods of one kind or another are a necessity. Throughout this paper suggestion, persuasion, and analysis have been sharply distinguished from one another, and regarded as independent methods of treatment. This has been necessary for the purpose of investigating and correlating the basic principles involved.
It has already been indicated, however, that in actual practice no school of thought relies excluasively on any one of the three, and that every psychotherapist employs at least two and often all three principles. The practitioner who confines himself to suggestion is, impotent when faced with many types of psychoneuro §es, and crude and inadequate in his treatment' of all types. Dubois. employs a certain amount of analysis and a considerable dose of suggestion. -4A perusal of D6jerine's work provides instance after instance of the use of analysis, and the employment of affective factors is an integral part of his method. Some of these affective factors clearly belong to suggestion, however narrowly we may define that term, and all of them come under that general conception of " complex thinking," which is identified with suggestion by many authorities, and is most certainly closely allied thereto. A similar criticism applies to all the analytical schools. If it be agreed, indeed, that the driving forces of the nmind are all ultimately dependent upon the interplay of instincts, then it is clear that without these emotional factors the mind cannot do anything, and nothing can be done to the mind.
CONCLUSION.
We may now attempt to sum up the conclusions reached in the foregoing pages. It was originally stated that all methods of psychotherapy are dependent upon the employment of one or more of three basic principles, sugaestion, persuasion, and analysis. Our investigation has shown, however, that suggestion is a term of vagrue and indefinite connotation, ranging in meaning from a conception identical with, " complex thinking" to a conception covering only the phenomena observed in hypnosis, and closely allied phenomena. Under these circumstances it would seem advisable to employ dome other term to indicate that wider conception of suggestion which includes within its boundaries apy employment of affective factors as curative agents, and to limit suggestion to those instances where the affective factors are those involving a direct affective relation between the doctor and the patient. The wider term which would seem the most appropriate for this purpose is " affective therapeutics." Our original statement would then be modified so as to read that all methods of psychotherapy eliminating these causal factors, and in this latter process persuasion and affective therapeutics are probably invariably called into play.
Practical psychotherapy, therefore, necessarily involves an admixture of principles, and this admixture will be there however the physician may endeavour to exclude it. Suggestion, for example, is omnipresent, and will obviously come into action whereyer there is a doctor and a patient. It is surely better then, that this action should be correctly estimated and deliberately 'utilized rather than left to the vagaries of chance. The task of the physician is to cure the patient, and in order to achieve this end he should be prepared to make use of any and every weapon which lies to his hand. Affective therapeutics, persuasion and analysis all have their place, but treatment can only be efficient if their nature and limitations -are clearly understood, so that the physician may choose and combine his weapons according to the condition which. has to be attacked.
